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Abstract
Patent-holding pharmaceutical companies are shown to be imperfectly able to charge dif-
ferential prices for AIDS drugs due to the potential for black market exchange. Thus, greater
segmentation in the international market through additional barriers to smuggling would induce
ﬁrms to charge lower prices for AIDS drugs in poorer countries. Without these additional barri-
ers, widespread drug distribution through mandated lower prices or weakened patent protection in
the developing world would result in smuggling, undercutting demand in developed markets and
reducing ﬁrms’ research incentives. By contrast, further market segmentation would allow policy
makers to go beyond the induced price cuts and remove patent protection in many markets where
the beneﬁts to increased distribution would likely outweigh the losses to research incentives.
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Within the debate over proper responses to the AIDS epidemic, one contentious 
issue is how to encourage both the discovery and the distribution of medicines 
able to treat the disease.  Without government intervention, there would be few 
incentives to research new medicines.  As a consequence, governments encourage 
research by granting patents to pharmaceutical companies, allowing invented 
medicines to be priced far above their marginal cost of production.  There has 
been considerable investment in developing AIDS drugs to the benefit of many, 
yet firms’ chosen prices have made them unaffordable for millions worldwide. 
If these firms were able to charge different prices to different groups of 
consumers, i.e., price discriminate, it could be possible to spread the use of AIDS 
drugs considerably while maintaining research incentives.  The economics of 
price discrimination have been studied in depth (Phlips, 1983; Tirole, 1988) and it 
has been successful in distributing low-cost vaccines in the developing world 
(JFK, 1997).  Price discrimination (a.k.a. Ramsey pricing, differential pricing, 
tiered pricing, equity pricing) is an intuitive mechanism for improving the 
distribution of AIDS drugs, as well (Hammer, 2002; Scherer and Watal, 2002).
1  
However, price discrimination is only possible to the extent that AIDS drugs sold 
at low prices could not be resold to those targeted for high prices. 
Exporting cheap medicines from low-income countries to high-income 
countries is generally now contrary to domestic and international law, though the 
effectiveness of these laws is unclear.  It is relatively easy to protect higher-priced 
markets from “generic” AIDS drugs produced elsewhere: more easily observed 
production and distribution are prevented by international law, production 
methods often remain secret, and consumers in richer markets are hesitant to use 
unknown drugs.  However, if patent-holding firms were to distribute the same 
AIDS drugs to countries at vastly different prices, there would be large incentives 
to acquire the drugs in low-price countries and sell them in high-price countries, 
reducing firms’ profits.  Thus, in order to charge high prices in wealthy countries, 
pharmaceutical companies may be forced to charge higher prices than they would 
otherwise choose in poor countries.  Alternatively, there could be little potential 
for arbitrage and firms do not find it in their interest to distribute drugs widely.  
Ultimately, this is a question to be answered by examining the available evidence. 
Scherer and Watal find some evidence that firms in the 1990’s charged 
lower prices for AIDS drugs in poorer countries, as one might expect of a 
successfully price-discriminating firm, though this effect diminished over time.  
Still, this finding leaves unanswered the crucial question of whether firms are 
fully able to charge differential prices.  If so, then efforts to lower prices further 
                                                 
1   For a collection of policy-oriented discussions on these issues, see also Granville (2002). 
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must focus on reducing firms’ market power through price controls or selectively 
removing patent protections, a.k.a. “compulsory licensing.”  Alternatively, if 
firms are constrained in their ability to charge lower prices in poorer counties, 
then prices could be lowered by increasing firms’ ability to price discriminate. 
Outterson (2005) argues that the potential for smuggling is not a binding 
constraint for firms.  The main evidence for this argument is the current lack of 
international smuggling, despite already large price differences.  Later theoretical 
analysis will demonstrate, however, that this is not the proper empirical test.   
When there is patent protection and price discrimination is constrained by the 
potential for arbitrage, smuggling would not occur in equilibrium.  Instead, prices 
would be kept high enough in poorer countries such that those seeking to exploit 
the potential for arbitrage would be kept just on the brink of the opportunity. 
Hammer surveys the interaction of economic, political, and legal aspects 
of price discrimination of AIDS drugs but many fundamental questions remain 
unanswered.  These include the key issues of whether allowing further price 
discrimination would increase welfare,
2 if firms’ current price discriminatory 
behavior is constrained, and, if so, what factors are creating these constraints. 
  Scherer and Watal outline why banning this “parallel trade” to allow price 
discrimination should result in welfare gains.  However, allowing further price 
discrimination will rarely benefit all consumers and could reduce welfare.
3  
Section II examines the international market for AIDS drugs to determine whether 
further price discrimination would be beneficial.  In the case of AIDS drugs, 
preventing smuggling from a small poor market to a large rich market to allow 
further price discrimination would increase total welfare. 
To explore whether firms are currently fully discriminating and charging 
country-specific optimal prices, it is necessary to focus directly on smuggling 
incentives.  Section III develops a simple model of a monopolist’s pricing 
decision in a rich and a poor market with variable segmentation.  When 
smuggling is a relevant threat, the low price elasticity of drug demand in richer 
markets would induce a firm to choose higher prices in poorer markets to 
discourage smuggling and enable higher prices in the richer market.  Thus, the 
model implies that the threat of smuggling would lead to higher prices for poorer 
countries, rather than leading to the onset of significant smuggling. 
Section IV uses price data surveyed immediately after the United Nations’ 
Accelerating Access Initiative to test the relevance of a smuggling threat at a time 
when political variation across countries in the price negotiation process is 
minimal.  After this standardized negotiation was available to each country, 
remaining price differences were significantly affected by a proxy for smuggling 
                                                 
2  A policy change will be said to increase social welfare when those made better off would be 
willing to compensate those made worse off, without the same then being true in reverse. 
3   See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) for how this could occur within the European Union. 
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potential, rather than by variables that proxy for domestic demand.  Thus, firms’ 
pricing decisions reveal a binding “black market constraint,” as they would 
otherwise obtain higher profits by lowering prices in poorer countries.  Anecdotal 
evidence on the viability of smuggling and the concerns of pharmaceutical 
companies supports the conclusion that prices are constrained by the potential for 
black market exchange. 
Section V outlines the implications for AIDS drug policy.  Because the 
potential for smuggling constrains firms’ prices, smuggling would be the expected 
outcome of future government efforts to reduce prices by weakening patent 
protection and/or using generic drugs.  This would erode patent protection in all 
markets, reducing research incentives.  Prices would remain high in poorer 
countries, because negotiated or generically produced low-price medicines would 
be smuggled out of poorer countries until market prices to obtain and consume the 
drugs approached their earlier levels.  In the case of AIDS drugs, this outcome 
would be particularly problematic because sporadic access to the drugs would 
promote biological resistance to the drugs and encourage virus mutations. 
Instead, efforts directed toward improving market segmentation would 
induce firms to price discriminate further, allow the international community to 
weaken patent law selectively in chosen countries, and facilitate negotiated bulk 
purchases or donations.  This would encourage future research through both 
increased firm profits and the demonstrated commitment to intellectual property 
rights.  Several policy practices, including some price controls and subsidies, 
undermine market segmentation and should be discarded. 
 
 
II.  AIDS drug demand and the welfare effects of price discrimination 
 
The international market for AIDS drugs includes several firms with legal 
monopolies over different complementary drugs.  Given this observation and the 
high price to marginal cost ratio, it is reasonable to approximate these firms’ 
actions by considering those of a simple monopolist.  Potential or actual generic 
competition can be seen as weakening this patent power, increasing the price 
elasticity of the monopolist’s market and decreasing its size. 
Consumers within a country pay roughly the same price for AIDS drugs, 
while there are substantial price differences between countries.  Many countries 
distribute drugs through public health programs, which would complicate a 
quantitative welfare analysis but does not affect a qualitative analysis.  It is 
adequate to assume that the monopolist sets a price in each country according to 
the standard model of third-degree price discrimination.  As the ability to smuggle 
between markets varies from very costly to costless, the outcome moves from a 
single international monopolist price to country-specific monopolist prices. 
3
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In general, it is difficult to determine the welfare effects of allowing a 
monopolist to move from a perfectly fluid market to one where third-degree price 
discrimination is possible.  This would cause prices and monopolist distortions to 
increase in markets where demand is less elastic to price and decrease in more 
elastic markets.  Thus, the overall change in total welfare depends on how much 
demand reacts to price changes at different price levels in the different markets. 
Previous theoretical work has shown, under increasingly general 
assumptions, that price discrimination will only increase welfare if output 
expands (Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Schwartz, 1990).  It is less clear, 
however, whether the increase in output would be sufficient to increase welfare.  
Varian provides the intuition that it would increase welfare if “one of the markets 
has small demand over the price range where the other market has large demand.”   
Layson (1994) identifies two conditions under which eliminating price 
discrimination would likely close markets: a large market share and larger profit 
margin for the higher priced market.  Both of these conditions are present in the 
AIDS drug market in the examined time period, where the West made up two-
thirds of the market by volume, and the ratio of profit margins on AIDS drugs was 
at least 8.
4  Layson’s rule of thumb, that the profit margin ratio should be greater 
than (1 + rich market share)/rich market share, is strongly met as 8 >> 2.5.   
Combined with the previous analysis, this suggests that further price 
discrimination would likely increase welfare. 
For a continuum of markets, Malueg and Schwartz (1994) show that price 
discrimination would increase welfare when there are large differences in 
demand, i.e., demand dispersion.  This is clearly the case in the AIDS drug 
market:  despite prices differing by an order of magnitude, only 4% of the 
developing world’s need for anti-retrovirals was met in 2002 and 15% in 2005.
5 
Finally, Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) note that while third-degree 
price discrimination will often increase static welfare, it is more likely to increase 
dynamic welfare, given the positive effects on research and development.  Even 
under perfect patent protection, R&D incentives will often remain below the 
social optimum.  Thus, further price discrimination of AIDS drugs would increase 
welfare through both improved drug distribution and higher research incentives. 
                                                 
4   In 2002, the time period analyzed later, the West’s market share was approximately two-thirds 
(UNAIDS 2002b; BBC News, “Aids epidemic ‘still in early stages.’” July 2, 2002) and the 
profit margin ratio is approximated as 8 assuming a yearly United States price of $13,000, an 
average Latin American and Caribbean price of $2,000, and an approximated uniform cost of 
$500.  By 2005, assuming few changes in Western drug consumption, the West’s market share 
had fallen to around one-third (UNAIDS 2005).  Still, Layson’s condition would hold for the 
2005 consumption data, even ignoring that the profit margin ratio would be much higher. 
5  These figures would drop to near 2% if one considers the ratio of those with HIV/AIDS that 
needs treatment to be the same in the West and the developing world (UNAIDS 2005; UNAIDS 
2002b; BBC 2002).  See also footnote 16 on page 18.  
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III.  A theory of optimal price discrimination with potential smuggling 
 
Despite large international price differences, it remains unclear whether firms are 
able to price discriminate perfectly.  High prices and low market penetration in 
the developing world could reflect either pricing constraints due to the threat of 
cross-border smuggling, or naturally high monopolist prices in the face of 
inelastic drug demand.  A testable hypothesis can be derived by considering a 
simple model of monopolist behavior with variable costs of smuggling that are 
affected by firms’ security expenditures. 
There are two markets in the model: a (rich) country with more inelastic 
demand at high prices and a (poor) country with more elastic demand at low 
prices.  These will simply be referred to as the “rich” or “poor” market, where 
rich and poor country variables are denoted by uppercase and lowercase variables, 
respectively.  The Monopolist will first choose quantities Q, q, and barriers B with 
production costs C(Q+q).
6  The Black Market then chooses an amount s to buy in 
the poor country, smuggle to the rich country at cost C(s,q,B), and sell in the rich 
country along with the Monopolist, but at a discount factor D.
7   
   
The Monopolist maximizes over choice of Q, q, B: 
(1)     ) ( ) ( ) , ( * ) , ( * B C q Q C s q p q s Q P Q − + − +  
 
    The Black Market maximizes over choice of s: 
(2)     [] ) , , ( ) , ( * ) , ( * B q s C s q p D s Q P s − −    
   Subject  to:    q s ≤ ≤ 0 
 
At first glance, using a revealed preference argument, smuggling must reduce the 
Monopolist’s profits because the countries’ consumption after smuggling was in 
the Monopolist’s original production choice set.  Furthermore, smuggling will not 
occur in any equilibrium because the corresponding choice by the Monopolist 
would be dominated by choosing the post-smuggling quantities and capturing the 
previous returns to the Black Market without paying the smuggling costs.
8 
                                                 
6   The results would be the same if the agents choose prices rather than quantities. 
7   The discount factor can represent an aversion to buying drugs on the black market or reflect any 
subsidies through government provision and implicit subsidies through the insurance market. 
8   If the rich market had multiple consumer types, it is possible that the Monopolist could use the 
Black Market to implement more profitable, potentially more efficient, price discrimination 
(see Anderson and Ginsburgh 1999 for a similar argument).  While theoretically possible, AIDS 
drug firms’ aversion to smuggling reveals this situation to be empirically irrelevant to the AIDS 
drugs case.  Compared to the motivating cases for Anderson and Ginsburgh, the poorer markets 
here have more substantial potential demand and there is less reason to expect much exploitable 
variation in consumers’ discount factors, as opposed to different arbitrage costs for consumers. 
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Figure 1.  Perfect (- - -) and imperfect (―) third-degree price discrimination 
 
 
 
To demonstrate the workings of the model, assume a perfectly fluid 
market, where D = 1 and C(s,q,B) = 0.  The Black Market would smuggle drugs 
to exploit any price difference, so the problem reduces to the single-market 
monopolist case where equilibrium prices are the same (thin solid lines in Figure 
1).  As D decreases and C(s,q,B) increases, the markets become more separate as 
the potential gains of smuggling fall and the costs rise.  This allows the 
Monopolist to induce increasingly divergent prices until the standard perfect 
third-degree price discrimination case is reached (thin dashed lines in Figure 1). 
More formally, using backward induction and beginning with the Black 
Market optimization, the first order condition for an interior solution is: 
 
(3)  [] [ ] ) , , ( ) , ( * ) , ( * ) , ( * ) , ( 1 2 2 B q s C s q p D s Q P s s q p D s Q P = − + −  
 
where a subscript of one or two represents the partial derivative of the function 
with respect to the first or second term, respectively.  Assuming perfect 
competition in the smuggling business, the second term on the left goes to zero, as 
smugglers do not consider their effect on overall smuggling opportunities.  This 
term would also be close to zero if there were no smuggling and we considered 
the necessary condition for smugglers to enter the market.  Thus, equation 3 
simplifies to: 
 
(4)     ) , , ( ) , ( * ) , ( 1 B q s C s q p D s Q P = −  
Rich Country  Poor Country
Price 
Quantity Quantity 
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Equation 4 is an intuitive result:  the discounted price difference is equal to the 
marginal cost of smuggling.  By substituting this “black market constraint” into 
the firm’s maximization problem, one can see how prices are bound together in 
the two countries.
9 
  As smuggling becomes possible and profitable, prices in the two countries 
move from their separate respective profit-maximizing prices to new prices that 
maximize profits subject to this new black market constraint.  Whether prices 
move more in the rich or poor country depends on the conditions outlined in 
Section II.  Once prices are bound together in this tug-of-war between domestic 
demands for AIDS drugs, firms would mostly reduce the quantity sold to the 
poorer market to raise prices and protect the richer market. 
If drugs were provided through the public sector in the poor country at a 
lower final price to consumers, the firm would not directly control the consumers’ 
price.  However, by setting the overall quantity distributed in that country, the 
firm determines the consumer with the lowest valuation to obtain drugs.  That 
consumer’s reservation price would be the price that exporters would have to pay 
to obtain supplies, which is the relevant price for the black market constraint. 
The same implications hold in the case of many countries.  Consider an 
ordering of countries, from the country with the lowest optimal single-market 
monopolist price to the country with the highest optimal price.  Assuming no 
smuggling, there would be a trivial linear relationship between the single-market 
optimal price and the realized price (dashed line in Figure 2).  If smuggling to all 
destinations were possible with a uniform constant marginal cost c and the results 
from Section II held in the extreme such that the highest price P remain fixed, 
then the price schedule would never decline below P – c (solid line in Figure 2). 
If the marginal cost to smuggling varied across countries, then prices to 
the left of the kink for country i would be: 
 
(5)     ) , , ( * ) ( ) , ( 1
i i i i i i i B q s C D Q P s q p − =  
 
where ) , , ( 1
i i i i B q s C  is the country-specific marginal cost of smuggling and P(Q) 
is the price in the highest price country.  Again, in a perfect information 
equilibrium with full patent protection, there would be no smuggling.  Thus, the 
proper empirical test would not look for smuggling of AIDS drugs; rather, it 
would test for a lower bound in the price schedule for countries poor enough to be 
to the left of the kink in Figure 2. 
                                                 
9   For completeness, note that equation 4 need not hold if the Black Market desired to smuggle a 
quantity s > q or s < 0 and was constrained to q and 0, respectively.  The first case would never 
be an equilibrium for the reasons described above.  The second case would revert to the perfect 
third-degree price discrimination model with no Black Market.  
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Figure 2.  Monopolist price for a continuum of countries:  no smuggling (- - -) 
and a uniform constant marginal cost c of smuggling (―) 
 
 
 
  The main weakness of the model is its failure to account for negotiation 
elements of the price setting process.  Depending on one’s interpretation of 
international law, countries could threaten to eliminate patent protection and 
produce or import generic AIDS drugs.  Particularly if there were uncertainty or 
imperfect information about when smuggling would occur, countries could 
possibly negotiate prices below the black market constraint.  These effects would 
be especially important for pilot programs or otherwise for securing small 
quantities of drugs.  The more basic smuggling incentive constraints, however, 
would be the dominant first-order effects in determining the pricing and flow of 
large quantities of drugs and, in particular, any amount close to what is needed in 
the developing world. 
The model also gives some insight into firms’ incentives to invest in 
barriers to smuggling, such as different packaging, tracking devices, or changes to 
the method of drug-administration.  Substituting the black market constraint into 
the firm’s maximization problem reveals a tradeoff between the firm’s obtainable 
gross profits, which is an increasing function of barriers to smuggling, and the 
cost of barriers to smuggling.  Maximizing net profit gives the condition: 
 
(6)     ) ( ) ( B C B ′ = ′ π  
 
The firm invests in barriers until its marginal cost equals the increase in gross 
profits.  Because increased barriers also increase welfare in poorer countries to 
P ― 
Optimal single-country price 
Chosen price 
(P – c) ― 
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more than offset the declines in richer countries (see Section II), barriers to 
smuggling would be lower than is socially optimal without coordination between 
firms and country governments.  Given that government and firm actions in 
producing barriers to smuggling are likely complements, i.e., one is less effective 
without the other, this coordination would be even more important. 
This is a surprising conclusion given the antagonism between firms and 
governments and the existence of some government policies that undermine 
segmentation efforts.  It is always difficult on equity grounds to suggest that 
poorer countries should contribute to international efforts, and an argument could 
be made that they should not be held responsible for anti-diversion efforts 
(Outterson, 2005).  Poorer countries stand to benefit the most from increased price 
discrimination, however, and they should consider contributing resources and 
providing various forms of assistance, especially if richer countries are hesitant to 
go beyond their own narrow interests and subsidize anti-diversion efforts. 
  A pharmaceutical company does have an incentive to cultivate a stable 
market in developing countries, although it is a smaller incentive than is socially 
optimal.  To the extent that the Monopolist might get public relations, advertising, 
or other benefits from providing drugs to poorer markets, private incentives to do 
so would be even larger.  A company will not sacrifice its more profitable 
markets, but these potential gains do encourage action even though many believe 
private incentives to run completely counter to humanitarian goals. 
 
 
IV.  Testing the relevance of a smuggling threat 
 
One cannot assume immediately that the above black market constraint is binding, 
as the optimal monopolist price may be quite high relative to average incomes, 
particularly in countries with significant income dispersion.  However, the 
analysis in Section III suggests a clear empirical test:  if prices in poor countries 
decline with proxies for the optimal single-market price, it would suggest that 
prices have not reached the kink in Figure 2.  In contrast, if prices are determined 
by proxies for differences in smuggling costs, it would indicate a binding black 
market constraint. 
  Empirical work on drug pricing, particularly for AIDS drugs, has faced 
several data problems.  First, the proper measure of price is often unobserved, as 
the relevant price measure is that which the pharmaceutical company controls: at 
the point of sale from the pharmaceutical company to the public health system or 
insurance company, net of all rebates and hidden discounts.  Second, because 
country-specific AIDS drug prices are the result of a complex negotiation process, 
political factors contributing to negotiation effectiveness and unobserved threats 
to produce or import generic drugs will substantially affect prices. 
9
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  Scherer and Watal (2002) examine Red Book wholesale list prices for 
AIDS drugs from 1995-1999, including 461 nation-product-year triplets, which is 
a large sample but of questionable quality as further discounts are common.  They 
assume a constant discount of 20%, but it would be likely to vary systematically 
across countries.  To control for the effects of generic competition and the price 
negotiation process, the ideal variable would measure the effectiveness of threats 
to use generic drugs.  Instead, Scherer and Watal include a dummy variable for 
whether the country granted any drug patents when the relevant drug was patented 
in the United States.  They note, however, in their referenced working paper that 
the proxy is evidently not serving its desired purpose, as they find the unintuitive 
result that a country that grants patents pays significantly lower prices.   
  Scherer and Watal find that drug prices increase with per-capita GNP 
(PPP-adjusted) and decrease with the number of HIV/AIDS cases, although the 
magnitude of the effects is small.  Scherer and Watal interpret the significantly 
positive coefficient on GNP as weak evidence for Ramsey pricing in poorer 
countries, while the effect of AIDS cases on price could have several theoretical 
implications.  From the analysis in Section III, this would imply that the black 
market constraint is not binding.  However, Scherer and Watal interact GNP with 
year dummies, finding stronger evidence for income-based price discrimination in 
1995 and no effect by 1999, as prices fell by 8.7% annually.  Based on the 
previous analysis here, this would imply an emerging black market constraint. 
  To address the price measurement and negotiation threat concerns, the 
empirical work here will use a survey by the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO) on prices for a year’s treatment paid by public health ministries in 11 
Latin American and Caribbean countries for two AIDS drug cocktails in May 
2001 and May 2002 (Table 1).
10  The survey was timed to capture prices before 
and after the United Nations’ Accelerating Access Initiative, which made 
centrally organized price negotiations available to each country, potentially 
reducing the importance of unobserved political variables in the second time 
period.
11  At this time, Latin America and the Caribbean represented 73% of anti-
retroviral treatment in the developing world (UNAIDS, 2002b).  It is important to 
examine a substantial market so that the determined prices and quantities reflect 
meaningful profit opportunities and potential smuggling.  By contrast, the theory 
in Section III would be less applicable to small pilot programs. 
                                                 
10  The country sample often overlaps that used by Scherer and Watal, where 11 of their 18 nations 
were from Latin America and the Caribbean. 
11   See UNAIDS (2002a) for further discussion of the Accelerating Access Initiative.  It is not 
possible to use differential progress in negotiations in the empirical analysis, as the only true 
exogenous aspect of the initiative was its availability to each country.  It will be assumed that 
each country had an equally strong threat of using generic drugs, though some interpretations of 
international law would assign a great potential threat to those countries with domestic drug 
programs:  Argentina, Columbia, and, in particular, Brazil. 
10
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Table 1.  AIDS drug prices in Latin America and the Caribbean 
  Price for a year’s treatment 
of 3TC/AZT/NVP, in $US 
Price for a year’s treatment 
of 3TC/AZT/EFV, in $US 
  May 2001 May  2002 May  2001 May  2002 
Argentina 1097.92    5182.27  1339.49 
Barbados   1339.49   2406.93 
Brazil 1409.90  635.10  1416.20  1306.70 
Colombia   5398.58   3618.72 
El Salvador      6250.76  2650
12 
Haiti     12568.70  1484.33 
Honduras   1314.00   1379.70 
Jamaica       1226.40 
Mexico  5112.92 6509.17  3914.02 3819.52 
Panama       2837.27 
Trinidad & Tobago  1825.00  1281.69  1200.85  1332.35 
Uruguay  4671.39   8013.83  
Venezuela 8093.28       
 
                                                 
12  Negotiations for El Salvador were completed shortly after the survey and so this data value was 
updated to approximately reflect the new 2002 price (reported in retrospect by Business Wire, 
“AIDS Healthcare Foundation Says Pharmaceutical Giants’ Reduced AIDS Drug Pricing for 
Central America Simply Not Low Enough.” February 1, 2003).  All other points were 
confirmed in press releases where possible, and no other contradictions were found.  The results 
are similar using the previous El Salvador value of $5,583, though the significance levels on the 
illicit drug variables drop to the 5% level due to the increased measurement error. 
11
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Rather than relying on the absence of a link between income and prices, it 
would be preferable to find direct evidence of a binding black market constraint.  
Following equation 5, one could relate prices to the marginal cost of smuggling 
from each country.  This is clearly difficult to measure, but useful proxies are the 
total value and per-capita value of all illicit drugs seized (UN ODCCP 2001).  
This is found by multiplying the quantity of each illicit drug seized in a country 
by the average wholesale price in Canada.
13  A destination price was chosen to 
capture the potential value of smuggled goods and to avoid mechanical 
correlation between country illicit drug prices and the AIDS drug price. 
The proxy is designed to capture the geographical, political, and economic 
factors that make smuggling AIDS drugs less costly.  Those countries with more 
corrupt public systems, less effective law enforcement, or which are 
geographically more suited to smuggling should be likely candidates for 
smuggling of both illicit drugs and AIDS drugs.  Also, companies might expect 
that initial AIDS drug smuggling would use the illicit drug trade infrastructure.  In 
fact, a smuggling ring was recently discovered in the United States that had 
included the purchase, distribution, and sale of black market AIDS drugs with its 
illicit drug operations.
14  After the Accelerating Access Initiative, it is less likely 
that these weaker political systems would affect AIDS drug prices simply through 
weaker negotiating. 
There is a concern that the opposite relationship might hold:  that a higher 
quantity of illicit drugs seized would be due to more effective law enforcement.  
This would be a particularly strong effect in a demand-driven market, such as for 
different American cities where the total quantity of illicit drugs demanded could 
be similar but drug seizures depended on the efficacy of local law enforcement.  
By contrast, for supply-driven markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
which largely export drugs to the United States and elsewhere, the quality of local 
law enforcement is a major influence on the illicit drug industry’s choice of 
location for production and transportation.  Thus, while better local law 
enforcement would mechanically cause higher drug seizures for a given level of 
illicit activity, one would expect the underlying amount of illicit activity to be 
much lower in a dynamic setting, resulting in lower overall seizures. 
That better law enforcement is not the dominant determinant of illicit drug 
seizures passes a basic common-sense test:  it is not generally believed that there 
is the same illicit drug activity in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, and Mexico, and 
that the differences in drug seizures are explained by vastly more effective police 
operations in Columbia and Mexico.  To the extent that higher quantities of seized 
drugs is partially mechanically due to better law enforcement, however, it would 
bias the empirical analysis against finding a positive effect on AIDS drug prices. 
                                                 
13  The chosen price was for Canada because all prices were not available for the United States. 
14  Associated Press, “AIDS drugs ‘smugglers’ nabbed.”  August 29, 2003. 
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Simple scatterplots show the hypothesized positive relationship between 
AIDS drug prices in 2002 and the total value of illicit drugs seized, in millions, 
(Figure 3) or the per-capita value of illicit drugs seized (Figure 4).  Data for both 
drug cocktails are shown, so some countries have two price observations.  Both 
relationships have disadvantages.  The first is driven by Columbia and Mexico.  
The second is prone to outliers such as Jamaica, which is a small country on the 
smuggling sea route to the United States, where per-capita values would overstate 
the quantity of drugs smuggled from the domestic population to abroad. 
To test whether prices are unconstrained and reflect domestic demand, a 
wide range of other variables is considered.
15  Gross national income per-capita is 
used, as the dominant effect one would expect is for a monopolist to choose 
higher prices in richer countries.  A monopolist might aim to capture rents only 
from the wealthiest citizens, so the average income of the wealthiest 10% and the 
GINI coefficient of inequality are also used.  Some countries may devote more 
resources to health spending, so health expenditure per-capita is included.   
Finally, those countries with more HIV/AIDS cases could potentially receive bulk 
discounts or otherwise face different price negotiations.  The hope is that any 
other potentially important variables that are omitted do not vary much between 
these Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly given the uniformly 
available negotiations under the Accelerating Access Initiative.  
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of OLS and robust regressions of AIDS 
drug price on the various potential explanatory variables individually, with a 
dummy variable for drug cocktail type and a constant.  While the sample size is 
quite small, the data are already aggregated over average prices of four drugs and 
these prices are the result of lengthy high-stakes negotiations, both of which 
should reduce noise in the price variable.  OLS regressions and robust regressions 
designed to reduce the importance of outliers display a common result:   
involvement in the illicit drug trade is a statistically significant predictor of AIDS 
drug price, while proxies for domestic demand are not. 
                                                 
15   Per-capita GNI, per-capita health expenditures, and population are for 2001 from the 2004 
World Development Indicators in contemporary US$.  The number of HIV/AIDS cases, in 
thousands, is from the July 2002 UNAIDS report.  Also from the 2004 WDI, the GINI 
coefficient and income shares were assumed to be constant over time as they were only 
available in select years:  2001 (Argentina, Brazil); 2000 (El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, Uruguay); 1999 (Columbia, Honduras); 1998 (Venezuela); 1992 (Trinidad and 
Tobago); none (Barbados, Haiti).  These data were published after the negotiations, but were 
likely to have been known to the countries, firms, and United Nations negotiators.  Preferred 
specifications are not in PPP terms, as pricing takes place on a global market exchange-rate 
basis, with the potential for cross-border flows, but little is changed when using PPP-adjusted 
values.  AIDS rate was also used instead of AIDS cases, with little change to the results. 
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Figure 3.  AIDS drug price in 2002 vs. total value of seized illicit drugs 
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Figure 4.  AIDS drug price in 2002 vs. per-capita value of seized illicit drugs 
 
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
A
I
D
S
 
D
r
u
g
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
(
i
n
 
U
S
$
,
 
f
r
o
m
 
P
A
H
O
)
0 50 100 150
Per-capita Value of Seized Illicit Drugs (in US$, from ODCCP)
 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Colombia 
Jamaica 
14
Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 16
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol5/iss1/art16 
Table 2.  OLS regression of 2002 AIDS drug price on: 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Drug Money  0.475             
 (0.105)**             
 20.8            Drug Money 
per-capita   (10.2)+           
   -0.010        GNI per-capita 
   (0.158)       
     0.050      GNI per-capita, 
top 10%        (0.066)       
      73.8     GINI 
coefficient         (68.0)     
        -0.146    Health exp. 
per-capita           (2.14)   
         -1.41  HIV/AIDS 
cases             (2.24) 
EFV dummy  -246  -643  -624  -893  -748  -620  -666 
 (564)  (766)  (877)  (1,020)  (998)  (873)  (865) 
Constant 1,867  2,049  2,792  2,339  -911  2,787  2,975 
 (489)**  (704)*  (989)*  (1,229)+  (3,715)  (916)**  (783)** 
              
Adjusted R²  0.55  0.15  -0.10  -0.06  -0.01  -0.10  -0.07 
Observations 17 17 17 14  14  17 17 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
     
Table 3.  Robust regression with Huber weights of 2002 AIDS drug price on:  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
0.675             Drug Money 
(0.110)**            
 30.7           Drug Money 
per-capita   (5.3)**           
   0.015        GNI per-capita 
   (0.105)       
    0.042       GNI per-capita, 
top 10%        (0.076)       
       74.0     GINI 
coefficient         (74.5)     
      0.040    Health exp. 
per-capita           (1.44)   
       -1.18  HIV/AIDS 
cases             (1.38) 
569 802 809  -622  -473 806  835  EFV dummy 
(454) (298)* (587)  (1,176)  (1,094) (587) (533) 
1,110  639  1,215 2,169 -1,196 1,265 1,391  Constant 
(393)* (293)*  (662)+  (1,417)  (4,070) (615)+  (482)* 
              
Adjusted R²  0.71  0.70  -0.01  -0.12  -0.06  -0.01  0.08 
Observations 16  16 17 14  14  17 17 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Combined with the theory from Section III, the results in columns 1 and 2 
of Tables 2 and 3 imply that the potential for AIDS drug smuggling is the cause of 
high AIDS drug prices in poorer countries.  Firms appear to be sacrificing profits 
in poorer countries by maintaining high prices in order to protect their other 
markets.  This revealed binding black market constraint indicates that a further 
decline in prices without additional barriers to smuggling would result in 
smuggling.  While countries in Latin America and the Caribbean pay lower prices 
on average than does the United States, poorer countries within the region do not 
obtain further lower prices.  This is contrary to some public statements and 
expectations, though in accordance with the findings by Scherer and Watal in 
later time periods. 
Tables 4 and 5 report OLS and robust regressions with combinations of 
demand proxies and illicit drug variables.  The sample size and close correlation 
between demand proxies make it likely to observe spurious results, so the health 
expenditure and top 10% GNI variables are dropped because of their respective 
correlations with GNI of 0.91 and 0.95.  The demand proxies have little joint 
explanatory power, demonstrated by the low adjusted R² values in columns 1 and 
2.  The magnitudes of the coefficients are difficult to interpret, but per-capita GNI 
has consistently insignificant effects.  Similar to the finding by Scherer and Watal, 
there is some evidence that having more HIV/AIDS cases lowers the AIDS drug 
price.  Inequality is somewhat associated with higher prices, though the result is 
driven by outliers in GINI values (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago), as is shown by 
the lack of a significant result in the robust regressions. 
Without an accompanying positive effect of GNI on prices, it would be 
tenuous to interpret this evidence as suggesting unconstrained monopolist pricing.  
Replacing GNI with top 10% GNI or health expenditures produces the same 
insignificant results, suggesting that prices are not kept high to capture rents from 
wealthy elites or higher government budgets. 
By contrast, both the total and per-capita illicit drug variables are 
consistently statistically significant predictors of a country’s AIDS drug price and 
typically add substantial explanatory power to the regressions.  When many 
regressions are run on a small sample, there is a large potential for spurious 
results.  Thus, it is important to focus on the only stable and robust result: that a 
country’s involvement in the illicit drug trade increases the price at which 
pharmaceutical companies are willing to sell AIDS drugs.  The theory in Section 
III and, in particular, Figure 2 implies that prices in poorer countries will be 
determined either by domestic demand or by the black market constraint.  When 
forced to choose between these two theories, the bulk of the empirical evidence 
indicates that smuggling concerns are the dominant determinant of price. 
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Table 4.  OLS regression of 2002 AIDS drug price on: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   0.494  0.432     Drug Money 
   (0.104)**  (0.129)**    
     20.5  29.1  Drug Money 
per-capita       (11.4)+  (8.4)** 
-0.040 0.259 -0.096 -0.027 -0.041 0.259  GNI per-capita 
(0.167) (0.239) (0.104) (0.184) (0.155) (0.161) 
  177.2   87.1   231.1  GINI 
coefficient   (80.8)+   (61.4)    (56.6)** 
-1.56 -5.16 -2.21 -3.70 -0.44 -4.42  HIV/AIDS 
cases  (2.41) (2.73)+ (1.49) (1.92)+ (2.32) (1.85)* 
        
-692 -976 -355 -564 -679 -963  EFV dummy 
(902) (922) (559) (642) (834) (620) 
3,178 -6,330 2,616 -1,762 2,316  -10,387  Constant 
(1,173)* (4,519) (731)** (3,374) (1,185)+  (3,259)* 
        
Adjusted  R²  -0.15 0.16 0.56 0.61 0.02 0.62 
Observations  17 14 17 14 17 14 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Robust regression with Huber weights of 2002 AIDS drug price on: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   0.685  0.637     Drug Money 
   (0.089)**  (0.076)**    
     48.8  43.5  Drug Money 
per-capita       (12.1)**  (14.7)* 
-0.000 0.226 -0.002 0.034 -0.131 0.046  GNI per-capita 
(0.106) (0.280) (0.064) (0.109) (0.121) (0.250) 
 169.7   62.5   136.5  GINI 
coefficient   (94.7)  (36.4)  (97.6) 
-1.18 -4.98 -1.77 -2.84 -0.44 -2.55  HIV/AIDS 
cases  (1.53) (3.20)  (0.91)+  (1.14)*  (1.77) (2.50) 
        
835 -811 606 465  -92 -578  EFV dummy 
(570) (1,080) (370)  (381)  (653)  (758) 
1,392 -5,986 1,332 -1,759 1,671 -5,506  Constant 
(741)+ (5,295) (472)* (2,002) (920)+ (5,343) 
        
Adjusted  R²  0.00 0.01 0.80 0.89 0.48 0.57 
Observations  17 14 16 14 16 13 
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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That AIDS drug firms are setting prices based on the potential for 
smuggling does not imply an absolute lower bound on prices.  The model in 
Section III is highly stylized, as it does consider threats to remove patent 
protection or an imperfect ability to predict smuggling thresholds.  Since 2002, 
there have been price cuts on paper for different drugs, but prices are still high 
and distributed quantities are constrained (Outterson, 2005; UNAIDS, 2005; 
PAHO 2005).
16  The purpose of this price analysis is not to identify a lower bound 
on prices, but to reveal firms forgoing increased profits in poorer countries to 
prevent smuggling to richer markets.  This demonstrates that widespread AIDS 
drug distribution in the developing world, without further barriers to smuggling, 
would undermine profits from developed markets. 
There is also strong anecdotal evidence that smuggling is a major concern 
for pharmaceutical companies.  In all negotiated price agreements, countries must 
nominally commit to prevent smuggling to other countries, particularly from 
poorer countries to richer countries.
17  Merck, the patent-holder for the AIDS drug 
EFV, has developed delivery methods and distinctive packaging to discourage 
smuggling.
18  The European Union has launched a plan to use logos on discounted 
drugs to prevent re-importation.
19  There is also evidence suggesting that firms 
will limit the quantity of drugs they supply to Canada if sales to the United States 
are not stopped.
20 
  When smuggling is less of a concern, international initiatives have been 
very successful at obtaining medicines at much lower prices.  This is particularly 
clear in the case of vaccines, where black market demand in the developed world 
is minimal and multilateral organizations often prevent diversion by handling the 
distribution and administration themselves (JFK, 1997).  Even for AIDS drugs, 
GlaxoSmithKline has been more willing to lower prices when charitable 
organizations were able to ensure their intended use in developing countries.
21 
                                                 
16   Care is necessary in interpreting coverage statistics as fewer people are deemed to require 
treatment in “resource-limited settings,” where it is recommended that treatment start later.  The 
lower percentage of infected people requiring treatment, compared to the United States, leads to 
overly optimistic coverage statistics.  There is also little availability of “second-line” drugs such 
as EFV, one of the drugs analyzed above.  Government commitments and goals to provide 
drugs to those who require them also create incentives to understate the remaining need. 
17  Heywood M.,  “World AIDS Day Teleconference Transcript.” Member of Treatment Action 
Campaign, November 28, 2000; Inter Press Service, “Victory in Fight for Low-Cost AIDS 
Drugs.” January 30, 2003. 
18  Wall Street Journal, “Merck to Cut Stocrin Price In the Poorest Countries.” October 23, 2002. 
19  Associated Press, “Low-Cost Drugs for Poor Countries Urged.” May 26, 2003. 
20  Associated Press, “Canada to Ban Bulk Exports of Rx Drugs.”  June 29, 2005;  USA Today, 
“Glaxo wants to keep cheaper drugs out of USA.” January 21, 2003. 
21    Faber, G., WTO/WHO Presentation (GlaxoSmithKline), WHO-WTO Hosbjor Conference, 
2001; Financial Times, “Glaxo Cuts Price of HIV Medicine.” February 22, 2001. 
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  Some propose that companies are hesitant to lower prices in poorer 
countries for fear of causing a backlash in richer markets (Kremer, 2002; 
Hammer, 2002).  One proposed cause of this backlash is the revelation of low 
marginal costs.  This explanation, however, presupposes that there are currently 
information asymmetries, but marginal costs are already known to be much lower 
than prices in developed countries.  A second proposed source of backlash stems 
from the violation of perceived fairness.  In the United States there is a current 
frustration with rising drug costs, but in an absolute sense or in comparison to 
Canada, rather than relative to poorer countries.  Some have purposefully not 
pushed for comparable price cuts in the United States for fear of jeopardizing 
price cuts in Africa.
22  There is no clear reason why these perceptions would 
allow prices to differ by an order of magnitude but no further. 
Wherever cheap drugs are available, they are susceptible to entering the 
black market to be sold elsewhere.  In Sweden, a woman attempted to exploit the 
public health care system to buy cheap drugs and export them to Eastern 
Europe.
23  In Chile, poorer citizens receiving free drugs from the government 
have sold them, even as more drugs are smuggled into Chile, where an estimated 
10-15% of anti-retrovirals are sold on the black market.
24 
Smuggling rings have been discovered that aimed to resell in Europe those 
drugs destined for Africa.
25  Contrary to the indications of early press reports, 
these are not examples of substantial arbitrage (see Outterson), but they 
demonstrate the desire and infrastructure for exploiting arbitrage possibilities.   
Recall from Section III that the presence of the Black Market would not result in 
substantial smuggling; rather, those seeking to exploit arbitrage potential would 
be kept on the brink of opportunity.  These small attempts merely reflect the 
fringe of the larger forces being kept at bay by restrained distribution.  Once 
smuggling incentives pass the critical threshold, smuggling would become 
rampant until “street” prices responded and the previous price differential was 
reestablished.  Smuggling would emerge especially rapidly if there were 
important fixed costs to be overcome before entry was profitable. 
Similarly, when Outterson argues that only small quantities are available 
on the local level for diversion, this is only a reflection of the current restrained 
distribution.  The ultimate policy goal is to obtain widespread distribution of 
AIDS drugs throughout the developing world, which is when the threat of 
                                                 
22   Wall Street Journal, “US drug buyers unlikely to seek deep discounts on AIDS medicines.” 
March 23, 2001. 
23  Associated Press, “Woman in Sweden accused of buying HIV drugs with fake prescriptions.” 
March 12, 2003. 
24  BBC News, “Chileans ‘trading AIDS drugs for food.’” July 11, 2002. 
25  BBC News, “Industry tackles AIDS drug scandal.” October 3, 2002; Washington Post, “HIV 
Drugs for Africa Diverted to Europe.” October 2, 2002; Washington Times, “African AIDS 
Pills Hit Black Market.” December 30, 2002. 
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smuggling would fully materialize.  The current market only offers clues of what 
would occur when the developing world is saturated with AIDS drugs: clues such 
as the apparent eagerness of arbitragers and firms’ willingness to sacrifice profits 
and their public image to prevent smuggling. 
  Citizens’ desire to participate in arbitrage and black market dealings is not 
limited to poorer countries.  An estimate of the value of prescription drugs 
smuggled from Canada to the United States is $650 million and growing 
(Graham, 2003).  In California, publicly provided AIDS drugs were diverted away 
from AIDS patients to assist body builders and give an energy boost.
26  The AIDS 
drug ddC faced strong black market demand when regulatory approval was stalled 
in the United States.
27  It may be true that the black market faces commitment 
problems in providing actual drugs rather than counterfeits (Outterson), but price 
discounts can compensate for this risk.  In addition, this commitment problem can 
be overcome through the standard reputation mechanisms and by the distinctive 
packaging and coloring of drugs that are needed to prevent them from being 
introduced at a higher stage of the supply chain. 
It is tempting to compare the incentives for smuggling illicit drugs and 
AIDS drugs.  The ODCCP report and PAHO data would imply an AIDS drug 
price differential around half of that for cocaine and marijuana, while Outterson 
estimates approximately equal price differentials.  Outterson concludes that the 
lack of current AIDS drug smuggling in the face of such potential indicates that it 
is never likely to occur.  This comparison can be misleading, however, given the 
differences in destination consumer markets.  Consumers in richer markets may 
often pay a lower out-of-pocket expense for AIDS drugs purchased through 
government programs or an insurance plan that is partially subsidized by other 
insurance holders or an employer.  
Of course, if all consumers in richer markets received AIDS drugs for free, 
there would be no market for smugglers; this is not, nor ever likely to be, the case, 
however.  Even when the price appears to be low, consumers often still pay a 
higher price for the drugs through insurance premiums or fees for additional third 
party prescription plans.  This is true for employer-provided insurance to the 
extent that there are lower-benefit higher-wage options available in the labor 
market.  Richer countries often supply AIDS drugs through government 
programs, but there are typically income maximums and benefit limits.  Also, 
governments may reduce their provision of drugs when consumers can acquire 
them elsewhere at a lower cost, e.g., the budget choices faced by border states 
when faced with arbitrage between the United States and Canada. 
 
                                                 
26  Los Angeles Times, “Black Market in AIDS Drug Flourishes: Control of hormone is laxer in 
California than elsewhere. Medi-Cal says it has stiffened rules.” February 16, 2003. 
27  USA Today, “Trade in Illicit AIDS Drugs Brisk.” June 17, 1991. 
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V.  Implications of a relevant smuggling threat for AIDS drug policy 
 
Encouraging both the discovery of new AIDS drugs and lower prices in 
developing countries for existing drugs is only part of the fight against AIDS, but 
it is a critical part.  Policy designed to lower prices and spread access to drugs 
must be combined with efforts to prevent smuggling.  It is not enough to ban 
“parallel trade,” as there will be a strong incentive to circumvent such laws.   
Without strong enforcement efforts, drugs will be diverted to other markets, 
creating shortages and raising prices.  Even where drugs remain, supply will 
likely fluctuate, leading to sporadic use among patients and the development of 
resistance to the drug therapy, even if the medicine supply remains authentic and 
safe.  The spread of smuggled drugs will support the rise of organized crime and 
violence, just as has been the case with the current illicit drug trade. 
  A simple calculation reveals the potential for smuggled drugs to undercut 
total research incentives in the global pharmaceutical industry.  In 2001, of those 
living with AIDS in the developing world, six million were considered to require 
anti-retroviral AIDS drugs, while 230,000 received treatment.
28  In the West, half 
a million people received anti-retroviral treatment.  If all of those who required 
treatment in the developing world received the drugs at cost and 5% were 
smuggled into the West for purchase by previous consumers, it would supplant 
60% of that market, severely undermining profits and research incentives. 
  This smuggling threat means that intellectual property policy for the 
developing world cannot be designed in a vacuum.  Proposals to eliminate patent 
protection in only the developing world (Lanjouw, 2001) are problematic because 
smuggling from those countries would weaken the effects of patent protection in 
the developed world.  Negotiation threats to allow generic competition in the 
absence of price cuts amount to the same policy.  Smuggling would undercut any 
policy to isolate a single poorer market and subsidize drugs, buy-out the patents 
(Kremer, 1998), or otherwise provide universal coverage. 
 Establishing  barriers  to smuggling in the international market is an 
important goal not only because it improves the efficiency of the patent system, 
but because it makes these other policy options more effective and more 
politically expedient.  Once markets are isolated, patent laws could be selectively 
eliminated or bought-out.  Countries have an incentive to import black market 
drugs, but also have a strong unilateral incentive to prevent their drugs from being 
exported.  By preventing smuggling, a country would secure lower prices and 
avoid the health effects of supply disruptions.  Thus, there would be no free rider 
problem in preventing diversions. 
                                                 
28  UNAIDS 2002b; BBC 2002. 
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It will be difficult to prevent smuggling under widespread AIDS drug 
distribution, but control over the distribution of legal drugs has an inherent 
advantage over illicit drugs – namely, governments would start in control of the 
drugs and would share a common goal with the producers.  Careful drug 
administration and packaging have been successful in a variety of situations 
(Hammer, 2002).  Also, if relatively minor technological improvements could 
allow pills to be administered less frequently and under supervision at a clinic, the 
potential for resale would be greatly reduced.  Finally, many of the resources 
spent to increase market segmentation would overlap with improvements in 
countries’ health infrastructure.
29 
  While it is always difficult to separate countries’ markets, some policies 
actively work against this goal.  Some countries, such as Canada, have used price 
controls that tie their price to those in a bundle of other countries, often poorer 
countries.  Thus, if a firm wished to charge a higher price in Canada, it would be 
encouraged to charge higher prices in the bundle countries.  Additionally, 
donations of money to buy AIDS drugs artificially bring donors into poorer 
countries’ demand, encouraging higher prices as companies respond to donors’ 
demand.
30  Finally, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
recently adopted a joint uniform price policy in an effort to increase their 
bargaining power, but this policy prevents likely beneficial price discrimination. 
  If governments avoided these policies and offered their cooperation, firms 
would have incentives to prevent smuggling and distribute drugs.  Private gains to 
profits and public relations would be less than is socially optimal, but it would be 
a start.  Preventing smuggling often would not require initial investment on the 
part of the poor country, balancing of competing domestic interests, or 
international coordination.  For the poorest countries, further international price 
discrimination would come close to benefiting them without any detrimental 
effects, as there would be very little effect on prices in the developed world. 
  One main reason that this coordination of anti-smuggling efforts has failed 
to materialize is the strong antagonism between countries and pharmaceutical 
companies.  Even if a firm were willing to make anti-smuggling investments, it 
would often require government coordination and cooperation.  To the extent that 
firms may invest too little in market segmentation, governments may need to 
contribute as well.  Where traditional donations may just encourage high prices 
and subsidize purchases by a country’s elite, foreign aid to increase market 
segmentation could truly extend drug access to developing countries’ poorest 
citizens.  
 
                                                 
29  See Granville for further discussion of methods to increase market segmentation. 
30  See Scherer and Watal for a further discussion of the price control effect and a proposal for 
structuring drug donations that would avoid these concerns. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
The widespread distribution of anti-retroviral AIDS drugs would be a major 
breakthrough in combating the AIDS epidemic.  However, prices for current and 
future AIDS drugs must remain high in the developed world to encourage the 
research and development of new medicines.  Obtaining both of these objectives – 
widespread drug distribution and the encouragement of research and development 
– requires that markets in the developed world remain insulated from drugs 
available at low prices in the developing world. 
Given the current potential for diverting, smuggling, and selling AIDS 
drugs, universal access to AIDS drugs priced near marginal cost in poorer 
countries would be impossible without flooding the market in developed 
countries.  This much is revealed by firms’ reluctance to lower prices in the 
developing world, a step which otherwise would bring greater profits and public 
relations benefits. 
To improve access to AIDS drugs and maintain research incentives, policy 
focus should shift from reducing firms’ market power to improving market 
segmentation and the viability of price discrimination.  Separating international 
markets through additional barriers to smuggling would increase social welfare 
under both a global patent system and a two-tiered system maintaining patent 
protection only in richer countries.  The initial steps toward further market 
segmentation can be driven by firms’ profit incentives and public relations goals, 
but the bulk of the benefit is to be reaped by poorer countries.  Thus, governments 
must coordinate and support this effort through international law, criminal 
enforcement, and investments in health infrastructure.  Antagonism, mistrust, and 
government policies that undercut such an effort must be avoided.  It is imperative 
for society both to extend access to these life-saving medicines and to commit 
itself to encouraging further research. 
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